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In order to address the negative impact that land confiscation has on the development of the 
country and on its own legitimacy, in 2012 the Union Parliament of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar established an Investigation Commission for the Prevention of Public 
Disenfranchisements Connected to the Confiscation of Farmland and Other Lands, also known 
as the Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission (PLIC). The Commission was assigned to 
examine cases considered to be land grabs and to propose solutions towards releasing the land 
to its original owners, in most cases smallholder farming families.  
This study presents a country-wide quantitative analysis of the Parliamentary Land Investigation 
Commission reports that were released to the public. Our aim is not just to analyze the 
information contained in the reports, but also to elicit information they do not reveal. Our succinct 
analysis allows for the formulation of relevant suggestions to be considered by the current 
government and non-government bodies involved in different processes of [confiscated] land 
redistribution, in particular the newly established Central Reinvestigation Committee for 
Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands, which was established on 9 June 2016. 
We have turned the four Commission reports that were disclosed to the public into a structured 
dataset that we have used as the basis for our analysis. We found that this dataset presents 
serious shortcomings in that it fails to provide detailed information about land grabs by the 
military. Based on the information released, the work of the Commission seems to have targeted 
urban areas and urbanization projects, which is a view supported by the preponderance of cases 
in the Yangon, Mandalay and Ayeyarwaddy urban agglomerations as well as by the central role 
played by the Ministry of Construction as the main body involved in land confiscation. By 
contrasting the locations of land confiscation cases with those of agro-industrial concessions as 
of 2011, we also show how the Commission has evaded, rather than tackled, some very critical 
land confiscation issues driven by these concessions. 
We argue for a mechanism that gathers, manages and releases relevant data on land 
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Throughout the history of Myanmar – from the colonial era to the present - land has been 
confiscated by a variety of government bodies, military factions and private corporations, for a 
variety of purposes: agro-industrial development; hydroelectricity projects; extractive mining 
industries; urbanization; military projects; etc. (Ferguson, 2014) . This has resulted in institutional, 
economic and social crises that have jeopardized the rights to land and the livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers across the country (ALTSEAN, 2014).  
The institutional pluralism and weak inter-sector coordination that currently prevails in approving, 
managing and monitoring land deals is a legacy from the past (Mark, 2016; Srinivas & Hlaing, 
2015) as no government thus far has managed to address contradictions and loopholes within a 
unified land governance framework. 
The unrest associated with violent land evictions and displacements has reached critical limits. 
Civil society groups have engaged counter-movements to address the issues and to seek more 
justice for smallholder farmers, drawing on a variety of legal and para-legal institutions and 
strategies as well as protests. In a context of political transition, the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar has been increasingly responsive to these issues. However, the process seems 
uneven as the legal framework instated in 2012 through the Farmland Law and the Vacant, 
Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law raises concerns in that it maintains ambiguity, has 
provided only weak protection of the rights of smallholder farmers in upland areas and because it 
has primarily paved ways to foster promotion of large-scale agricultural investment (Oberndorf, 
2012). 
In order to address the negative impacts that land grabs have on the development of the country 
and on its own legitimacy, in 2012 the Union Parliament established an Investigation Commission 
for the Prevention of Public Disenfranchisements Connected to the Confiscation of Farmland and 
Other Lands, also known as the Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission (referred to in this 
study as ‘the Commission’ or ‘PLIC’). The Commission was assigned to examine cases 
considered by farmers to be illegal grabs and to propose solutions to release the land to its 
original owner, in most cases a smallholder farming family (Repubic of the Union of Myanmar, 
2013). In a positive move towards more transparency, the Commission has opened up to the 
public and released the information contained in some of its reports. 
A number of fine-grained case studies have revealed the difficulties associated with the effective 
return of land to an original land owner (Pierce, 2015; Pierce & Huard, 2016; ShareMercy, 2015). 
But our study aims to take a step back and to present a country-wide quantitative analysis of the 
Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission reports that were released to the public. We are 
interested in examining the information contained in these reports but also in eliciting information 
they do not include. Our succinct analysis allows for the formulation of relevant suggestions to be 
considered by current government and non-government bodies involved in different processes of 
[confiscated] land redistribution, in particular the newly established Central Reinvestigation 
Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands, established on 9 June 2016. This case 
study is also intended to contribute to an MRLG-supported Learning and Alliance initiative aiming 
to discuss and analyze the current attempts by the new government to address the question of 
the return of land that was previously confiscated. 
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Background  
The Parliamentary Land Investigation 
Commission: a background 
The Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission (PLIC) was established by Union Parliament 
decree No.52/2012 in August 2012 to tackle the return of confiscated farmland and other land 
and comprises 74 members. It was officially dissolved in 2016, but, in a move to continue the 
endeavours of the Commission, the new government has initiated the creation of a Central 
Reinvestigation Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and Others Lands as well as 
corresponding regional/State committees (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2016). 
The Commission was tasked with receiving and scrutinizing complaints as well as providing 
recommendations on the mechanisms that would ensure the effective return of land to the 
original owners (Repubic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013). Institutionally, the reporting on cases/
recommendations flowed from the Director General of the Parliament Office to the Director 
General of the Union Government Officei. However, the Commission had no authority to resolve 
land disputes; it was the Ministry of Home Affairs (through the General Administration 
Department (GAD)) that was assigned to take action to follow the Commission’s 
recommendations. Consequently, we are not making an evaluation in this brief about the 
effectiveness of the actual land return process by the PLIC. 
The Commission sent a series of 18 reports to the Union Government Office from 13 September 
2013 to 21 January 2016. The 18th report from the Commission to the Union Government Office 
indicates that 14,756 individual complaints had been received and filed. These reports were 
subject to divergent interpretations by various stakeholders resulting in important variations in the 
actual numbers of cases filed, scrutinized and handled by the Commission. This has resulted in 
some confusion. 
In fact, the quality and level of details contained in the Commission reports are not consistent. 
First, there are indications of duplicate cases as the time periods covered by these reports 
overlap. Second, data on the characteristics of the land confiscation process and the status of the 
resolution process is incomplete. Reports 5 to 16 do not contain any quantitative figures on land 
area confiscated or the number of farmers losing land; they mention only the number of 
complaints and the number of cases scrutinized. Some cases may contain dozens of affected 
farmers, while other cases consider only one farmer. It is not clear whether or not detailed 
information contained in these reports was directly conveyed to GAD for action: this information 
has not been released to the public. In order to work with one consistent dataset, we decided to 
focus our analysis on reports 1 to 4 (see Table 1). Although this might present only a fragmented 
view of the Commission, we suggest that an analysis of the first four reports can still provide 
insightful observations on the Commission’s endeavours towards addressing land confiscation 
and promoting transparency. 
Each of these reports deals with a specific type of confiscation: i.e. the first report deals with 
complaints about land confiscated by the military (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013), the 
second report deals with confiscation by urbanization/industrialization projects (Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, 2013a), the third with transport infrastructure as well as agriculture-related 
land grabbing (Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2013b), and the fourth with other cases that 
have not been mentioned in previous reports but pertain to similar categories (Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, 2013c).  
 
 As can be seen in Table 1 below, the total number of cases filed and scrutinized by the 
Commission, and detailed in the first four reports, is 866. This number cannot be compared with 
the total number of complaints (i.e. the 14,756 individual complaints in the 18th report, mentioned 
above) because these are cases of collective land seizure, meaning that the number of 
households who were actually affected was more significant. The total area of land at stake was 
467,749 acres, (53 percent were military-driven land confiscations). These are aggregate figures, 
stated as such in the reports; they are not the results of our own computation. 
Table 1. Summary of aggregate data released as stated in reports 1 to 4 of the PLIC 
Source: PLIC reports 1 to 4. 
Note: Figures given here are copied from reports 1 to 4. They are not the result of our own computation. 
* Percentage represents the share in the total (=866) 
** Percentage represents the share in the total (=467,749 acres) 
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  Report 1 Report 2 Report 3 Report 4 
Land confiscation 
















Submitted by the 
Commission to the 
government 




565 (65%)* 63 (7%)* 117 (14%)* 121 (14%)* 
Complaints received 
by 24.01.2013 31.01.2013 Not available Not available 
Area of land 
scrutinized 
247,077 acres = 
99,988 ha (53%)** 
109,634 acres = 
44,367 ha (23%)** 
94,693 acres = 
38,321 ha (20%)** 
16,343 acres = 
6,614 ha (4%)** 
Total 
Number 
of cases 866 land confiscation cases 
Area size 467,749 acres = 189,291 ha 
Background  
 A deeper look into the Commission dataset 
Based on the textual information contained in each report, we created a computerized database 
that provides characteristics about land confiscation cases scrutinized by the Commission. This 
database has been structured by the land confiscation process and includes data about the 
location of the cases (state/district/township), which allowed for a representation of the cases on 
a map ii. The dataset also includes the year of the initial land confiscation, the entity or individual 
responsible for it, the land area involved, and the number of farmers affected. 
Gaps and silences 
Our dataset suggests that a total of 283,638 acres (114,784 ha) was scrutinized by the 
Commission, which involves 186 cases (166 cases only give details of the land area involved) iii. 
This is significantly less than the aggregated figures announced in the Commission reports 
(467,749 acres and 866 cases). The core explanation for this gap comes from the fact that all 
military-related cases were referred directly to the military and reported along different processes 
and procedures iv. The absence of any information about the military land confiscation cases 
buried in the first report is problematic given the importance of military-related land confiscation 
cases in Myanmar, particularly between 1988 and 2011.  
Despite the information it gives about location, grabber and land category involved, the dataset is 
far from complete. The information about the year of confiscation is missing in 80 percent of 
cases, which makes any analysis of land grabs in relation to the historical circumstances virtually 
impossible. The information about the number of farmers affected is also missing for most of the 
cases reported (86 percent). The information gap is even more pronounced when it relates to the 
area of land actually released to farmers (missing in 95 percent of cases) and the status of the 
resolution (missing in 74 percent). This seems to suggest that the number of cases actually 
resolved is more limited than the number of cases scrutinized, which seems to correspond with 
the Namati report (Pierce, 2015).  
Another difficulty is that, although the report indicates the number of cases and areas of the land 
confiscated that were actually scrutinized, it does not give the total acreage of land that was 
grabbed in the first place, which might be significantly higher. As a consequence, the database 
does not provide an accurate estimation of the extent of land grabbing. 
In many instances, land was initially confiscated from an original owner and then passed on to 
other land investors along processes that sometimes involved several transfers. However, the 
information available in the Commission reports does not capture the institutional complexity of 
these transfers because, as suggested by Pierce and New Ni Soe (Pierce & Nwe Ni Soe, 2016), 
the Commission was probably not equipped to tackle this. 
Urban bias 
On the basis of the information released in reports 1 to 4, the approach and work of the 
Commission to address land confiscation is overly focused on urban areas and urbanization 
projects. 
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The category of land that was 
confiscated is primarily farmland, 
which confirms that it was 
predominantly farmers who suffered 
(see Figure 1).  
However, the work of the 
Commission has focused on urban 
areas just outside of main urban 
agglomerations (central built-up 
areas and suburbs). A very 
significant number of cases (47 
percent) and land area (84 percent) 
of land confiscation scrutinized by 
the Commission were indeed 
located in Yangon, Mandalay or 
Ayeyarwaddy. 
Figure 1. Category of land confiscated 
Source: Authors’ computation from Commission reports 2 to 4.  
Figure 2. Details of projects driving land confiscation  
Source: Authors’ computation from Commission reports 2 to 4  
Figure 2 confirms the urban focus 
of the Commission work in that 51 
percent of the project land area 
involved industrial zones in  and 
outside of Yangon and 14 percent 
involved infrastructural 
development projects (in both rural 
and urban areas). The tendency of 
the Commission to look primarily at 
urban cases reflects the prime 
concern of the military 
governments, which related to 
urbanization and infrastructure 
development activities, as depicted 
in the National Building Grand 
Strategy. 
This contrasts with the much 
smaller (35 percent) area relating to 
confiscation by agro-business 
companies, although they are 
recognized as major culprits in land 
confiscation cases. 
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A deeper look into the Commission dataset 
The focus on urban areas reflects the fact that the main land-grabbers are ministerial bodies who 
have been responsible for 51 percent of the total land area released, among whom the Ministry of 
Construction (MoC) has accounted for 62 percent of ministry-driven land confiscation cases (see 
Figures 3 and 4). Confiscation cases by the MoC for urbanization projects are far more significant 
than cases attributed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI) and the Ministry of 
Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MoECaF) although the latter has been notoriously 
involved in land grabs, particularly for agro-industrial concessions.  
This urban bias is also quite problematic because it leads to an under-representation of cases in 
rural areas where land confiscations were in full swing particularly between 1988 and 2011. 
Figure 3. Main body involved in land confiscation 
Source: Authors’ computation from Commission 
reports 2 to 4 
Figure 4. Ministry involved in land confiscation 
Source: Authors’ computation from Commission 
reports 2 to 4 
A geography of evasion 
In order to interpret the spatiality of the Commission work, as revealed in reports 1 to 4, we 
mapped the location of land confiscation cases scrutinized by the Commission between 2012 and 
2013 side-by-side with the location of main agro-industrial concessions as of 2011 (see Figure 5). 
Adding to the earlier observations on the urban bias, the contrast between both maps reveals 
that the Commission has not targeted agro-industrial concessions areas where many land 
confiscations are reported. The map shows the spatial mismatch is particularly striking in Kachin 
State (rubber and cassava concessions) and Taninthayi (oil palm concessions). Interviews 
conducted with members of parliament for this study revealed that these regions were purposely 
avoided by the Commission. All of these observations seem to validate the claim that the 
Commission has evaded some very critical land confiscations issues rather than tackling them.  
 Figure 5. Location of land confiscation cases scrutinized by the Commission and agro-industrial 
concession as of 2011 
Source: Authors’ mapping based on data computation from Commission reports 2 to 4. 
A deeper look into the Commission dataset 
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Conclusion and recommendations 
The decision of the Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission to release information about its 
work to the public was a promising step towards a more accountable relationship between the 
authority of the State and the people of Myanmar. It is a necessary condition towards more 
justice for smallholder farmers who have been affected by land confiscation in the past. 
Yet the dataset extracted from the Commission reports shows major deficiencies that limit the 
knowledge that can be inferred from it. And to a certain extent, the dataset proves to be more 
informative in what it does not show. The key underlying problem is the lack of a clear indication 
about the methodology designed and deployed by the Commission to identify and scrutinize land 
confiscation cases. 
Our succinct analysis has revealed the fact that the Commission has not made public a 
significant number of land confiscation cases, particularly those related to the military and to agro
-industrial and mining concessions. This has two important implications. First the public 
information released is a very incomplete basis on which to evaluate the extent of land conflicts in 
Myanmar. Second, all subsequent efforts by government and non-governmental bodies to return 
land to the farmers will be incomplete if they base their efforts on the public information released 
in the Commission reports. How the Commission findings will be linked with new mechanisms 
under the Central Reinvestigation Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands is, 
however, unclear. 
The key recommendation we formulate is to allow full access to the information tackled by the 
Commission. This will form a basis on which the Commission methodology can be properly 
assessed and a necessary step - though not sufficient in itself - towards more efficient and fair 
return of land to dispossessed smallholder farmers. 
 Endnotes 
i In certain cases, information transited via the Land Use Allocation and Scrutinizing Committee 
(LUASC), which, in 2014, was expanded into the National Land Resources Management Central 
Committee (NLRMCC) before being abolished in March 2016 when the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) government was elected. 
ii The information available on the location of each case was limited to the township name. In 
order to get the geo-referenced location of the confiscation, we determined the number [x] of 
confiscation cases within each township and then randomly distributed [x] points within the 
boundary of the township.  
iii The land area of land confiscated is on average 1,708 acres (691 ha) but entails important 
variations (standard deviation = 6,838 acres, minimum = 0.009 acres (0.003 ha) and a maximum 
of 69,000 acres (=27,923 ha). 
iv The total aggregate acreage from the reports 2, 3 and 4 is 220,670.77 acres. This figure is 
different from the total of the database we constructed based on these reports (283,357 acres). 
This is partly because some military cases (that were reported along different processes and 
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 The Mekong Region Land Governance Project aims to contribute to the design of appropriate 
land policies and practices in the Mekong Region. It responds to national priorities in terms of 
reducing poverty, improving tenure security, increasing economic development, and supporting 
family farmers, so that they can be secure and make good decisions on land use and land 
management. MRLG is operating in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam since April 2014, 
with the support of SDC and the German cooperation. For more information on MRLG, please 
visit www.mrlg.org.  
 
The MRLG Case Study series analyses specific institutions, projects or policies that occur on 
issues concerning land security for smallholder farmers in the Mekong Region. It is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates the object of study within a real-life context. The production of a case 
study is usually undertaken at the initiative of MRLG but we also accommodate proposals 
originating from outside the programme. 
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